



# SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT; NORTH WEST REGION; SOKOTO

Prepared for: NCDC / Nigeria CoPREP PROJECT.

**OPERATING IN AN  
UNCERTAIN WORLD**

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## LIST OF ACRONYMS

CoPREP	COVID-19 Preparedness and Response Project
FCT	Federal Capital Territory
GoN	Government of Nigeria
NCDC	Nigeria Center for Disease Control
NPF	Nigerian Police Force
NPHCDA	National Primary Health Care Development Agency
NSCDC	Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corp
PCU	Project Coordinating Unit
SMF	Security Management Framework
SRA	Security Risk Assessment
VAC	Vaccination Approval Criteria
WB	World Bank
PHC	Primary Health Center
GH	General Hospital
SF	Security Forces
TTP	Tactic Technique and Procedure
MO	Modus Operandi
OCG	Organized Criminal Group

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.

The scope of this Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is specific to Sokoto, Nigeria. This assessment and report were produced in January 2022. Risk scenarios were identified, and a vulnerability analysis was conducted relative to project personnel activity. A series of mitigation measures were identified for each to reduce personnel risk to as low as practical. The recommended mitigation measures are included in this report and should provide the basis for security plans for activity in the city.

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# 1. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY SITUATION.

Sokoto State is in the extreme northwest of the country on the national border with the republic of Niger. Being the seat of the former Sokoto caliphate, the city is predominantly Muslim and an important centre of Islamic learning in Nigeria.

Hoodlum attacks and banditry are major security challenges in the state. The porous border with Niger Republic has exposed Sokoto state to a proliferation of small arms and light weapons. LGAs east of Sokoto like Isa, Sabon Birni, Rabah, Goronyo and Kebbe (south of Sokoto), as well as Gudu (west of Sokoto) have significant levels of insecurity due to their proximity to areas of Zamfara and Niger republic considered to be overwhelmed by bandit activity. The extent of the ungoverned spaces and the porous nature of the state and national borders is believed to facilitate the infiltration of criminal elements in and across the state.

First responders to security incidents within the local communities are vigilantes. Government Security Agencies' (GSA) interaction within the rural communities is largely insignificant. The complexity of the terrain poses significant accessibility constraints as most communities in the hinterlands are only accessible using motorcycles and in rare cases can they be reached by vehicles.

On a general note, activities of armed bandits associated with physical assault and kidnapping is the most impacting threat in the state. Sokoto is currently assessed as a MEDIUM to HIGH risk State.

## 1.1. TERRORISM.

Sokoto's geographical position, with the Niger Republic's borders to the West and North, Zamfara to the east, along with its large areas of thinly populated and ungoverned space, allows for unmonitored cross border activity and increases the likelihood incursion by terrorist groups. Although there has been no recent terror attack in Sokoto, there is increasing speculation by pundits that the North-Western organized criminal groups (OCGs) are beginning to ideologically aligning themselves with terror groups operating in the Northeast as well as the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), which is known to operate in the Niger Republic. Additionally, in January 2022 the Federal Government declared that the Yan Bindiga Group, the Yan Ta'adda Group and other similar bandit groups were proscribed as terrorists pursuant to sections 1 and 2 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011. It is therefore a moot point whether the frequent OCG bandit attacks classified under crime should now be declared as terrorism. The possibility of terror attack in the future, particularly in the eastern part of the state, remains LIKELY with the risk rating **MEDIUM**.

## 1.2. CRIME

Crimes such as robbery, theft, fraud, mugging, carjacking are considered medium across the state. However, physical attack, sexual attack, robbery and community invasions perpetrated by OCGs have increased significantly over the past 3 years in the state. The most impacted LGAs are Sabon Birni, Isa, Goronyo, to east, Rabah and Gudu, to the west and Kebbe to the south. The drivers for the increased crime rates in Sokoto include high levels of unemployment, the lack of internal and external investment in the job market, peer pressure, poverty, porous borders, low GSF visibility, and ongoing GSF security operations within the neighbouring state of Zamfara. While the likely exposure of staff to other related crimes is medium, risk of exposure to banditry is currently rated **HIGH** due to presence of armed OCGs. Without significant reduction

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in the threat level, the activities of OCGs will have a significant impact on the programme's access to a number of LGAs and continuity of delivery.

### 1.3. CIVIL UNREST.

Compared to other states in the region, Sokoto has historically experienced low levels of civil unrest. In Illela LGA and Maberu area of Sokoto south LGA, there have been occasional reports of IMN protests but these have generated little/no impact. However, residents in Goronyo and Sokoto North LGAs are reported to have taken to the streets to demonstrate and register their disenchantment regarding the deteriorating security situation,. Additionally, there is occasional religious protest, such as when statements credited to a popular Christian cleric in the state were alleged to be '*anti-Islamic*', causing tension in some quarters of the state. The risk that civil unrest impedes access to vaccination stations, cause damage to vaccines and materials or distrupts the vaccination process remains likely, thereby rating it as **MEDIUM**

### 1.4. TRAVEL RISK.

The frequency of road traffic accidents in Sokoto is considered Low according to available data from the National Bureau of Statistics. However, road travel risk needs to be judged against the country's record of fatal RTAs. Data by the FRSC and the National Bureau of Statistics put Nigeria's road casualty average at 33.7 per 100,000 people annually. This is tragically grim and translates to an average of 5,200 road deaths per year between 2014 and 2019. However, despite the frequency of international travel across the Nigerian border through Illela into neighboring Niger Republic, Sokoto is a lightly populated state. So, reported incidents of road traffic accidents at least compared to other states in the region is rated **MEDIUM**. This can largely be attributed to the good road condition connecting LGAs in the state

### 1.5. KIDNAP.

Kidnap has become a major threat to operations in Sokoto state and region at large. Activities of armed OCGs have been associated with kidnapping of local residents including farmers, school children and businessmen. In many instances, homes are raided and family members taken away by bandits' groups until ransoms are paid. Some isolated cases have seen the victims being killed, even after the paying of a ransom by the family of the victim(s). The Spearfish incident dataset suggests that in 2021 at least 16 kidnap incidents occurred in the state, with around 214 victims taken. Many kidnaps were in Goronyo, Sabon Birni, Dange Shuni and Tureta LGAs. Even though this threat is considered medium within the capital, it is more likely to occur in the outskirts of the capital. This trend poses a threat to vaccine administration and response. This threat is rated as **HIGH**

### 1.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

Although, endemic diseases such as cholera and cerebral meningitis have been common in the state in past years. The major medical safety concern for Sokoto state is the ongoing Covid-19 pandemic and the annual outbreak of cholera. In the case of cholera, cases occur predominantly in the rainy season. According to NCDC data, during 2021 there were 8,477 cases of cholera of which 410 died (cumulative fatality rate of

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4.8%)<sup>1</sup> whilst there were 810 cases of Covid of which 28 died (cumulative fatality rate of 3.4%)<sup>2</sup>. The Covid-19 pandemic has further heightened the risk to staff working in the state. Considering the programme staff duties in delivering vaccinations, contact tracing and response, this will likely make them first contacts with possible infected persons. This threat is rated as **MEDIUM**.

### 1.7. FIRE EVENT.

There have been many reported cases of fire incidents in the state. In the past, major markets and private homes have been reportedly exposed to major fire incidents, largely fueled by the extreme hot weather in the state and dryness. Due to likelihood of fire incidents particularly at vaccine stores that uses power frequently, this can be considered a **MEDIUM** threat that can be reduced to LOW with adequate mitigative measures

### 1.8. ENVIRONMENT (WEATHER).

Flooding in Sokoto can be a major hazard at the peak of rainy season due to inadequate water channels and whenever there is a release of water from the Goronyo and Lugu dams. Some of the most impacted LGAs include Goronyo and Tangaza LGAs forming a major seasonal threat that is likely to impact the CoPREP project and is rated as **MEDIUM**.

### 1.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

All programmatic planning delivery sequencing associated with the administration and emergency response to COVID-19 inclusive of training for staff, stakeholder engagement that could impact on programming whether in terms of delay or failure is assessed to be **LOW** based on findings.

### 1.10. DEPLOYMENT.

The risk associated with operational and logistics aspect of the programme that can affect vaccine delivery to vaccination centres in good storage temperatures thereby impacting on vaccine efficacy is rated LOW based on findings. Adequate connection to the 33KVA national grid as the Ultra Cold Chain (UCC) being connected to alternative solar power while the Walk-in Cold Room (WICC) has 2 standby generators serving it as well as the arrangement with E-health Africa for vaccine delivery to the LGA makes the process more standardized leaving the risk at **LOW**.

### 1.11. POLITICAL.

The risk associated with influence of political class, traditional institutions as well as activities of armed opposition groups having the capability to contest control of certain areas impacting on vaccine roll out and delivery in the state is considered **MEDIUM**. Sokoto, being a state in opposition from the centre and with the year being an electioneering campaign year, the capability of armed groups installing village heads in selected communities in eastern part of Sokoto makes this risk stand at medium.

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<sup>1</sup> NCDC Update on Cholera Outbreak in Nigeria – Week 52/2021

<https://ncdc.gov.ng/diseases/sitreps/?cat=7&name=An%20update%20of%20Cholera%20outbreak%20in%20Nigeria>

<sup>2</sup> NCDC Update on Covid-19 Outbreak in Nigeria – Week 52/2021

<https://ncdc.gov.ng/diseases/sitreps/?cat=14&name=An%20update%20of%20COVID-19%20outbreak%20in%20Nigeria>

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## 1.12. CORRUPTION.

With the massive roll out plan and administration of vaccines at public and private places, chances of corruption amongst staff and production of counterfeit vaccines cannot be ruled out. Findings from processes have not indicated likelihood of staff being dishonest or engaging in extortion and bribery to short-change the process. This is rated **LOW**

## 1.13. COMMUNICATION.

Existence of several conspiracy theories about vaccine administration and the motive for these vaccines poses a risk to staff and makes them vulnerable to direct/indirect attack, as well as a risk of vaccines being destroyed. Failures in sensitization, coordination, the absence of telecom services (which was recently restored in the state), the existence of fake news and counter narratives all constitute a risk to staff and vaccine roll out. Assessment in the state rates this as a **MEDIUM** risk.



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## 2. EVALUATION OF SECURITY RISKS.

### 2.1. INTRODUCTION.

In carrying out this risk assessment a wide range of information sources have been used, including but not limited to:

- Feedback with programme and state government employees via an SRA checklist.
- Official UK, US and Australian Government websites.
- The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Project website.
- Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics.
- UN Department of Safety & Security (Nigeria)
- Open and closed commercial security sources available to the Consultant.
- Discussion and peer review within the Consultant management team who collectively have a large amount of security and risk assessment experience.

In identifying the key risks, several factors were considered such as:

- The threat of terrorists targeting the vaccination programme.
- The threat of civil unrest in the proximity causing damage to the vaccination locations.
- The risk of natural disasters, particularly flooding.
- Reputational, political, and financial risks to the donor and programmatic organisation.

The following section entitled Risk Description and Estimation will identify the risks that are considered relevant to this report. For a full description of the probability and impact scores, please refer to **Annexes A and B.**

## 3. SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT.

### 3.1. INDIVIDUAL RISK DESCRIPTION AND ESTIMATION.

#### 3.1.1. TERRORISM.

##### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team or member of the general public being killed or injured by a terrorist attack against the vaccination location itself or nearby targets including other building in use by the programme roll out.

##### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>(VBIED) Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device</b>	An attack using a parked or moving vehicle (including lorry, car, motorized rickshaw or moped) to deliver an explosive charge against the entrances or adjacent areas around the programme storage or vaccination delivery points.	Although this is a recognized method of terrorist attack, there is no history of the use of this method of attack against any medical facilities or vaccination programmes and no intelligence that suggests such targeting presently, but it remains a possibility.
<b>(PBIED) Person Borne IED</b>	An attack using a person(s) to deliver an explosive charge(s) to deliver an explosive charge against the entrances or adjacent areas around the programme storage or vaccination delivery points.	Common method of delivery and extremely effective if access can be gained to the interior of a target location. This TTP was commonly used in NE Nigeria and places like Kano and Kaduna by Boko Haram, often causing injury and death in specific areas: markets, mosques, SF checkpoints, IDP camps. Secondary attacks can often follow primary attacks. No records of similar attacks have been reported in Sokoto
<b>Armed attack</b>	An attack by single or teams of people using guns, IED's and grenades to injure or kill people at close quarters, either during the attack or by a delayed hostage scenario, using the media to maximum effect.	This method was commonly used in the NE and Kano. Handheld grenades or RPGs are initially used which sets confusion amongst civil population or SF formations, before teams using guns directly attack their victims. This is a common TTP of OCGs and, since government proscription, such attacks can be classified as terrorism.

##### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
<b>1 - Terrorism</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

### 3.1.2. CRIME.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by a criminal event such as armed attack, sexual assault, organised crime, theft or act of physical violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements that has a serious impact on the programme delivery (theft of vaccine, equipment etc.) or reputation of the programme.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Armed Attack</b>	An attack by single or teams of people, including OCGs, using guns to injure or kill people at close quarters. This is often associated with community invasion for looting rustling and kidnap.	Directed attack on civil population and/or government security forces using small arms fire. Significantly common in eastern Sokoto, Gudu and Kebbe LGAs and has the capability of constituting risk to staff at vaccination centres.
<b>Sexual Attack</b>	Programme member of staff falling victim to a sexual assault resulting in harassment, sexual disease, injury or death.	As is common with OCGs, sexual assault is associated with their MO. Staff who walk on lonely roads that are unlit and/or which are under the control of armed OCGs are susceptible to such incidents
<b>Organised crime</b>	Infiltration of an organised criminal group into the running of the vaccination programme itself, resulting in fraud, theft, loss of assets/funds, employment malpractice or adverse publicity for NCDC and State Health Ministry if exposed.	Local groups, mostly youths whose leadership is not carried along or who have a perceived reservations about a program are more likely to negatively impact the programme. In some instances, even when involved they find a means of short-changing the process causing disrepute to the implementing body (NCDC)
<b>Theft</b>	Programme member of staff falls victim to a criminal act, either losing valuables or money, by mugging or pickpocketing, or some other form of theft from their person or the items are taken whilst unattended in common areas, programme storage or delivery sites, or from staff accommodation.	This risk can impact on vaccine availability or staff being exposed to mugging where criminal groups capitalize on vulnerability of staff. Staff will be vulnerable if they set patterns or demonstrate wealth in poor areas. There will also be a risk of theft of project equipment in the event of poor logistic accounting and controls.
<b>Drug taking or smuggling</b>	Instance of drug taking within program premises for individual use, or the taking place of drug dealing either retail, i.e., to users, or wholesale, to other drug dealers. Use of methanol to enhance low grade alcohol resulting in death or injury of the imbiber	Illicit drug consumption is reported in Sokoto state particularly in Dange Shuni and Ilella general area. This is however not reported in the immediate vicinity of programme
<b>Staff dishonesty</b>	A member of staff engaging in dishonest conduct, such as fraud or embezzlement of funds, equipment or vaccines from the programme itself.	Findings have revealed frauds of this nature occur in other routine immunization programmes, particularly at the vaccination point. The possibility of insider fraud or theft on the COVID-19 vaccination exercise cannot be overruled

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
2 - Crime	4	3	HIGH

### 3.1.3. CIVIL UNREST.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team being adversely affected by unrest caused by rioting, demonstrations or political violence. Incidence of the vaccination location being targeted by organised criminal elements due to brand ownership of World Bank as an international donor. Any anti-vaccination movement targeting the programme in the form of local protests.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Community clash/ Riot	Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being caught in a localised civilian clash or riot	Occasional protests/riots are organized against government policies, based on perceived failures of government. In Goronyo and Tureta LGAs, similar threats were reported. The tendency for security forces to intervene to disperse formal protest is likely. SF response can be overly robust.
Demonstration/ Protest	Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being caught in a protest or demonstration either directed towards the programme or a local but unconnected issue.	Occasional protests/riots are organized against government policies based on perceived failures of government. In Goronyo and Tureta LGAs, similar threats were reported
Political violence	Incidence of a member of staff or a programme delivery site being affected or injured by political violence associated by an election or local political issue that is associated with the area or specifically in relation to the vaccination programme	The political froth leading to next year's elections is likely to generate regular and sometimes violent protests. This could lead to the escalation of security measures with the associated application of lock-down measures in tempo with the rise in threat.

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
3 - Civil Unrest	3	3	MEDIUM

### 3.1.4. TRAVEL RISK.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being killed or injured by an exposure to road traffic accident (RTA) when travelling to pick up vaccines from the state from the LGA as well as to from PHCs to LGA cold chain. Grievous injury could also be sustained as well as death while going for vaccination duties at vaccination centers by staff

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
RTA	Incidence of a programme vehicle being involved in a road traffic accident whilst effecting delivery of personnel or vaccine supplies to programme sites.	Over speeding, non-usage of seat belt, dangerous overtaking, use of phones while driving and bad road condition all lead to road traffic accidents. In comparison to other states in the northwest, available data reveals this risk is average in Sokoto with frequent incidents reported along Sokoto-Ilella road
Vehicle Theft or Hijack	Incidence of a programme vehicle being stolen whilst parked and unattended, or actively hijacked from programme personnel following and encounter with an IVCP.	For communities with a local presence of OCGs, this is a common risk. Usually, the MO is to dispossess residents of their vehicles and, in some instances, kidnap the victims.
Boat Accident	Incidence of a boat accident where programme activities require the movement of personnel and stores by water.	This is more common in those LGAs with large water bodies or where rivers pass through. This risk is present in Goronyo, Wurno, Wamakko and Silame

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
4 - Travel Risk	2	4	<b>MEDIUM</b>

### 3.1.5. KIDNAP

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

A programme member of staff is kidnapped either during work or out of hours, resulting in disruption to programme delivery.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Kidnap for Ransom</b>	The kidnap and detention of a programme member of staff until a cash ransom is paid.	Kidnap for ransom remains an enduring risk across the state. In the past 18 months, every Sokoto resident and visitor has become a possible target for kidnap, from wealthy individuals to the poorest subsistence farmer.
<b>Express Kidnap (One Chance)</b>	The short term kidnap of a programme member of staff in order to force the removal of available cash from ATMs.	Although Express kidnap is particularly prevalent where there is wealth and a high frequency of ATMs, the incidence of this type of kidnap is not common to northern states. Major towns like Illela and Sokoto town are likely to be more susceptible to this kind of threat.
<b>Ideological kidnap</b>	The kidnap and detention of a programme member of staff in order to achieve political aims.	Health workers have in the past been abducted by organized criminal groups based on their experience to render medical care to injured victims of organized criminal groups (OCGs). Many of such incidents have been reported in eastern Sokoto and western Zamfara where local pharmacy owners or PHC staff are targeted

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
<b>5 - Kidnap</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>HIGH</b>

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### 3.1.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being killed or infected by diseases.  
Incidence of the vaccination administration paused or further infecting other patients at vaccination centers.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Disease</b>	Incidence of a member of staff contracting an endemic disease as a result of their programme delivery and/or interaction with target stakeholders, causing them to be unable to work or requiring their hospitalisation/isolation.	Diseases present a documented health hazard in Sokoto, although they can be anticipated and treated with specific medication, hygiene and personal health and wellness care. Records of Malaria, Diarrhoea, Cholera and Meningitis have been reported
<b>Sickness</b>	Incidence of sickness due to personal physiology or due to the ingestion of a sick bug, causing them to be unable to work.	Even though the work force of this project are local staff, the likelihood of ingesting food items that upsets the system is likely.
<b>Accident</b>	Incidence of a work-related accident during programme delivery which is of such severity that they are temporarily or permanently unable to continue their duties.	Accidents regularly occur in work environments and particularly where there are high numbers of people. The risk of serious accident will be reduced by proper planning, rehearsals, and the strict adherence to safety SOPs.

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
<b>7 – Medical Emergency</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

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### 3.1.7. FIRE EVENT.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Damage or destruction of a programme facility, related equipment or to personnel, because of a fire.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Arson	The malicious use of fire to cause the damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment or personnel.	The risk that ex-staff, disgruntled staff as well as persons with reservations against the programme set stores and vaccination centres on fire remains possible, even though no reports of such were reported in the state
Fire outbreak	The collateral involvement in a fire event causing damage or destruction of programme facilities, equipment or personnel due to the dense and chaotic nature of the urban landscape.	Uncontrolled fires at bins, power surge and lack of adequate fire safety equipment presents a real threat of fire incidents. Cold chain management requires connection to power which forms a risk of fire outbreak where there is poor, shoddy workmanship in premises or loosely connected power cables. Poor electrical workmanship and the chance of power fluctuation means that the risk of a fire outbreak remains likely.

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
8 - Fire Event	3	3	<b>MEDIUM</b>



### 3.1.8. ENVIRONMENTAL - NATURAL CATASTROPHES.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team being killed or injured by a natural catastrophe such as tsunami or earthquake. Incidence of the vaccination centre being closed, damaged, or destroyed by such an event. Damage to vaccine stocks or other equipment required for roll out. .

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Flood</b>	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured by drowning or crush injuries created by the force of water	Poor drainage system within Sokoto town has in the past led to flooding, in most instances during the peak of rainy season (July-September), as well as when there is excessive release of water from Goronyo and Lugu dams
<b>High wind</b>	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured, or the damage or destruction of programme assets, due to very high wind gusts.	This occurs majorly during rainy season (June to October) and has the capability to carry objects with it causing harm and discomfort, as well as potential interruption of power supply.
<b>Lightening</b>	Incidence of a programme member of staff being killed or injured as a result of lightening.	Usually associated with storms that occur shortly before rainfalls. This has the capability to strike individuals as well as cause serious havoc to buildings, trees etc.
<b>Excessive Heat</b>	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team adversely affected by high heat. Impact to supplies or facilities due to elevated temperatures (e.g., lack of refrigeration to vaccine etc.).	This can affect staff or cooling systems. This may cause heat-related injuries, like heatstroke; if untreated, can lead to staff death. Excessive heat can also affect functionality of cooling systems, particularly when transporting vaccines with ice packs (Most likely to occur between March-May).

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
<b>8 - Environmental</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

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### 3.1.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

A failure to properly plan delivery sequencing, inform stakeholders and train programme staff in advance of project start, risks unexpected issues which will delay, alarm and potentially cause the failure of the programme.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Covid protocols</b>	A failure to insist on strict Covid protocols at vaccination centres causes these same centres to become Covid super spreader fulcrums.	Beneficiaries and local stakeholders must be aware of all existing protocols associated with vaccine administration. Findings indicate that protocols are being adhered to.
<b>ID capture</b>	A failure to capture reliable information on the numbers being vaccinated progressively throughout the programme results in doubts as to data efficacy and ultimately a loss of confidence in the process.	ID card is seen to be manually done but when details (name, dates, vaccine type and QR code) are not adequately captured, it constitutes a failure to programming.
<b>SF discord with Civilian population</b>	Incidence of elements of the supporting security force generating tension due to their discord with the local community.	In Sokoto state there is no evidence of discord reported between local population and SF at those PHCs which already host vaccination programmes.

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
<b>9 - Programmatic</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>LOW</b>

### 3.1.10. DEPLOYMENT.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Operational and logistical aspects of the programme roll out face risk interruption to vaccine delivery to field sites and, potentially, risk to vaccine efficacy if vaccine storage temperatures can't be maintained.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Distribution interruption</b>	Poor logistical management causing interruption of vaccine supply to the field, leading to delays in the overall programme	In certain areas, distance and poor road conditions could impact vaccine centre opening/closing times. Access to the hinterlands of Sokoto and distant communities pose a challenge to vaccine delivery. E-health Africa has however taken up the responsibility of vaccine delivery limiting the likelihood of this.
<b>Power Interruption</b>	Incidence of power interruption leading to write off of vaccine stock due to heat damage. (According to brand, Covid 19 vaccines must be stored within a relatively narrow temperature range).	Likelihood that this occurs is slim. Cold chain arrangement has the WICR connected to 33KVA national grid backed by alternate source of power in 2 standby generators, while the UCC is connected to solar alternate power.
<b>Unexpected vaccination window extension</b>	Incidence of interruption to the smooth deployment of stock and medical delivery of vaccinations leading to unplanned extension of the delivery time period.	Unplanned time extensions to programme delivery risk disruption elsewhere in the programme and potentially increase risk to staff due to extended field presence in high-risk areas.

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
<b>10 - Deployment</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>LOW</b>

### 3.1.11. POLITICAL

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

The concurrent acceleration of political campaigns in the lead up to the 2023 elections could impinge, tangentially or directly, on the programme's ability to deliver effectively. In certain areas of the state the government's authority and control is challenged. In these areas there is increased security risk which will challenge the programme's ability to access areas and deliver vaccines.

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Elections</b>	Concurrent political campaigns causing dilution to programme communications or directly impacting the effectiveness of the vaccine delivery programme.	Electoral news will take more and more news time as the election nears. Communication of vaccine roll out risks being squeezed out of airtime and print space. Political activists could use the vaccine programme as a vehicle to attack the political opposition. This is very likely in Sokoto
<b>Traditional Rulers</b>	Failure to apply the correct notification protocols in the lead up to vaccine delivery causing a snub to the traditional ruler in that area. A withdrawal of royal or religious approval could result in a loss of buy in by the local community.	Current COVID-19 emergency response team has traditional institutions inculcated even though their knowledge of protocols could not be ascertained.
<b>Contested Areas</b>	Incidence of restricted access. Programme delivery might not be possible in certain parts of the country where the legitimate government's authority is being challenged.	The presence of armed OCGs in eastern Sokoto has seen the appointment of OCG affiliated village heads in some communities, as well as the collections of a levy or 'tax' from local farmers before they are allowed to access their farms. This and other similar contestation constitutes risk to programming
<b>Discrimination</b>	Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team not being impartial during vaccine administration	Likelihood of administering vaccine based on politics, religion, race, tribe and gender remains very unlikely in Sokoto

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
<b>11 - Political</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

### 3.1.12. CORRUPTION.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Incidence of an employee, contractor, or member of the vaccination team to engage in theft or fraud in order to enrich themselves

#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
Staff dishonesty	A member of staff engaging in dishonest conduct, such as fraud or embezzlement of funds from the programme itself.	Fraud or embezzlement of funds could rapidly sap the tempo and vigour of the vaccine programme roll out, resulting in failure to vaccinate large parts of the population. No reports of such in Sokoto state but it remains a likely risk.
Extortion	Extraction of resources from the programme by a staff member because they have been placed under duress by a third party.	Locally recruited programme staff could be placed in this situation by criminal elements within the local community. No reports of such but remains likely.
Bribery	Incentivisation of programme staff to disrupt or cause the failure of the vaccine programme.	Politically motivated agents could seek to disrupt the programme in order to make the incumbent government (federal, state or local) look weak and disorganized. There is no known historical evidence of this risk in Sokoto state.

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
12 - Corruption	2	3	LOW

### 3.1.13. COMMUNICATION.

#### SCOPE OF RISK:

Failure to properly inform and forewarn communities of the vaccine programme could result in poor attendance. Failure to coordinate the sequence of community attendance could result in excessive crowds and increased risk of disorder. The use of social media to publish false news or counter narratives by traditionalists or politically motivated opposition could result in poor attendance or a mass refusal to take the vaccine.


#### RISK SCENARIOS:

Risk name	Description of risk	Estimation
<b>Sensitisation</b>	Poor communication and lack of timely programme advertising resulting in low take up of the vaccine amongst communities	Major sensitization campaigns are currently ongoing in the state; radio jingles and other forms of sensitizations making this risk unlikely.
<b>Coordination</b>	Failure to coordinate attendance scheduling, resulting in excessive queues with long waiting times, generating dissent and potential civil unrest.	The risk associated with bad planning and coordination is low as there is already an aversion to taking the vaccine amongst the population. Thus long waiting times and massive queues are unlikely.
<b>False News</b>	Incidence of social media challenges as to the efficacy of the vaccines versus traditional medicines, generating doubt and leading to low turnout at vaccine centres.	The use of social media to sow false information is a recognised problem in countries which already have high vaccine take-up. This has largely impacted the roll out programme with low turn outs for vaccination so far. This is a significant risk.
<b>Counter Narratives</b>	Incidence of anti-establishment commentary suggesting that the vaccine programme is a government plot to infect the population with unknown chemicals, resulting in stakeholder refusal to be vaccinated.	Comments of this sort have been reported in certain quarters in the state, leading to vaccine hesitancy. This is a significant risk.
<b>Telecom Shutdown</b>	Employee, contractor, member of the vaccination team exposed to incident due to absence of telecommunication services to aid planning and deployment	In October 2022, the ongoing SF operations in Sokoto led to an initial shutdown of telecom services in 14 LGAs impacting on communication, thereby constituting risk to travel. The risk of further state government initiatives in support of security operations remains likely.

#### OVERALL RISK RATING:

Risk name	Likelihood	Severity	Score
<b>13 - Communication</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>MEDIUM</b>

## 4. ANALYSIS OF IDENTIFIED SECURITY RISKS (EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL).



	Threat Scenario	Impact	Probability	Risk
1	Terrorism	4 Severe	2 Possible	Medium
2	Crime	3.2 Moderate	4.2 Highly Likely	High
3	Civil Unrest	3 Moderate	3 Likely	Medium
4	Travel risk	4 Severe	2.1 Possible	Medium
5	Kidnap	3.8 Severe	3.3 Likely	High
6	Medical Emergency	2.8 Moderate	2.8 Likely	Medium
7	Fire Event	3 Moderate	2.8 Likely	Medium
8	Environmental (Weather)	2.7 Moderate	3.3 Likely	Medium
9	Programmatic	2 Minor	2 Possible	Low
10	Deployment	3.1 Moderate	1.9 Possible	Low
11	Political	2.6 Moderate	3.4 Likely	Medium
12	Corruption	2.8 Moderate	1.8 Possible	Low
13	Communication	2.7 Moderate	3 Likely	Medium

In terms of analysing the impact and likelihood of the highlighted threats, the two headline threats are crime and kidnapping which constitutes High risk levels amongst other risks. Aside from crime and kidnap, threats like terrorism, civil unrest, travel, medical emergency, fire event, weather, deployment, political, corruption and communication all have significant impacts (a minimum of moderate).

Like other north-western states where concerns of terror groups continually grow, activities of organised criminal groups categorised under 'Crime' remain the major security threat in the Sokoto as it is reported to have impacted on economic and social lives of people in the eastern part of the state. Consistently, high levels of banditry and kidnapping exists in Sokoto, notably within communities that share borders with Zamfara State. The major security issues identified include kidnap for ransom, banditry, sexual assault and armed robbery.

Attention must also be given to other risks like civil unrest, travel, fire, environmental as well as other internal risks like deployment and communication as they will also impact on vaccine roll out and administration. An element of these risks can be addressed by security design, but equal importance must be placed on security procedures, training and management of staff to reduce them to the lowest level possible.

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The remainder of the risks, some of which can have a significant impact, are also unlikely in the context of the current situation in Sokoto state. Although the tolerance for the risk is unlikely to be any higher, they should become accepted as reasonable norms of operating in such an environment. This does not reduce the requirement to manage them to the lowest level possible and management should consider the introduction of all reasonable precautions as part of its longer-term planning.



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## 5. RISK MITIGATION MEASURES & PLAN.

### 5.1. INTRODUCTION.

A multi-layered approach to security is effective as it can mitigate risks using generic principles. This section will propose several risk controls for approval by the NCDC programme team and State Government to address the risks identified above. As discussed initially, they will be written as objective statements, i.e., the desired state that is to be achieved, not how to achieve it. As shown below, each control's predicted reduction on its risk will be documented. This will then form the basis for the Security Management Framework, which will be written after this risk assessment has been accepted and signed off by the client.

### 5.2. INDIVIDUAL RISK MITIGATIONS.

#### 5.2.1. TERRORISM.

##### RISK CONTROLS:

- Project security adviser will issue advisories on any areas where specific threat is expected based on liaison with local authorities.
- It is clearly impractical that staff avoids all public places, places of worship etc but duty of care suggests informing them of targets as part of security awareness training.
- Avoidance of pattern setting (times, routes, locations, and vehicle/personnel profiles) is to be actively managed by project security focal point.
- Information assurance ('need to know') procedures to be implemented.
- Project should be very cautious with content in media actions needed for communication and sensitisation activities as there is risk of attracting the attentions of OCGs.
- Security Adviser to advise staff to maintain a low profile when working in Sokoto.
- Emergency response plan for all personnel, to include immediate action on armed attack on a public place or building with staff present.
- Project security manager or security focal point to actively monitor all personnel, especially those on field work outside the office.
- Identify potential safe haven locations in event of a series of attacks making movement difficult.
- Identify potential evacuation routes in the event of an attack on vaccination centres or facilities frequented.
- Staff to be trained on how to respond to exposure of IEDs (PBIED or VBIED) as well as active shooter incidents.
- Rules of Engagement (RoE) for reaction by supporting security agency to be clearly understood by all.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
1 Terrorism	1	3	LOW

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## 5.2.2. CRIME.

### RISK CONTROLS:

- Staff advised to always maintain a low profile.
- Project security adviser to track criminal trends and events and notify organisation's Management of any significant issues that could affect the project
- Security awareness training to include avoidance of pattern setting information security and management of personal profile.
- Drivers are instructed not to travel in the early morning before 7:00am and after 5:30pm
- Drivers to be trained on security awareness
- High value movements (cash or valuable equipment) to be planned in coordination with project security adviser
- Project security adviser to adequately liaise with security stakeholders (NPF, NSCDC and DSS) during coordination for movement of staff and materials to get update on trend as well as local vigilante for information at the local community
- Staff are advised on how to improve site security at their individual residences and can seek personal advice from project security adviser.
- Emergency response procedure through a local CMT to handle incidents on a case-by-case basis.
- Staff should avoid lone walking in unlit places to avoid exposure to mugging.
- Project security adviser to document locations with trend of sexual assault and make recommendations in terms of staff deployment.
- Project management should work on improving acceptance within local community.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
2 Crime	3	3	MEDIUM

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### 5.2.3. CIVIL UNREST.

#### RISK CONTROLS:

- During election periods work is suspended or reduced as much as possible in the state.
- Security adviser to issue advisories to all personnel including drivers of areas to avoid, based on liaison with local authorities.
- Security adviser to check all proposed routes avoid areas of potential unrest.
- Security personnel working with the project at any point must have been briefed and understand the ESS 4, page 48 of the World Bank ESF. Project RoE must be based on these standards. Issues like unrest, crime, and other physical threats must adhere to these rules.
- Staff to be advised not to participate in protests or demonstrations.
- CMT to include immediate action on civil unrest situation developing.
- Potential safe haven locations for use in event of widespread unrest in the city or vaccination centres to be identified within Emergency Response Plan (ERP).
- Identify potential evacuation routes in the event of protracted unrest in Sokoto.
- Staff to be briefed on the need to avoid political or religious confrontations during induction training.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New Probability and Impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
3 Civil Unrest	2	2	LOW

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## 5.2.4. TRAVEL RISK.

### RISK CONTROLS:

- Enforce speed limits.
- Driver selection and training based on Sokoto experience.
- Person responsible to assess rental cars before hire and report as fit for purpose.
- Use of seatbelts must be enforced on project vehicles.
- Staff crossing water bodies must use life jackets (if safe to cross), else if capability of local boat riders seem uncertain, consider avoidance.
- Person responsible to conduct regular (at least monthly) vehicle inspection checks including spare parts and medical equipment.
- Sufficient vehicles should be provided to vaccination and emergency response teams to avoid overload.
- A proper journey management system should be established for the vaccination teams that involves proper planning, monitoring and response to incident.
- Drivers should undergo a defensive driver training programme.
- Cap driving hours of drivers to reduce fatigue and stress. It is noted this is difficult to enforce but it is a serious cause of RTA and the concern cannot be ignored.
- A ban on all vehicle movement after dark.
- Nearest Hospitals and Ambulance services MUST be identified by the project security adviser.
- Contact lists for physicians within the medical facilities need to be established by project security adviser.
- Remote location Med Evac plans should be understood by all travellers.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
4 Travel Risk	2	2	LOW

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### 5.2.5. KIDNAP.

#### RISK CONTROLS:

- Project security adviser to disseminate any new kidnap specific advice as a priority.
- Kidnap awareness to be included in induction training, pattern setting, information security, reducing profile to kidnapers.
- Staff to maintain a low profile always.
- Hired vehicle drivers should be briefed on kidnap prevention.
- K & R training and preparedness for all staff should be done at least once a year.
- Travel itinerary to be kept confidential and shared on a need-to-know basis.
- Person responsible for journey management to enforce proper management of staff movement in the field.
- Staff Tracking and Journey Management guidelines.
- K & R setup like Proof of Life should be done for staff.
- K & R insurance policy and requirements to be reviewed and advised by project's management.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
5 Kidnap	2	4	<b>MEDIUM</b>

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## 5.2.6. MEDICAL EMERGENCY.

### RISK CONTROLS:

- Awareness training on measures to prevent infection, including the use of high-concentration insect repellent, COVID 19 PPE (Personal Protective Equipment), protective clothing, and netting at night.
- Organisation to comply with COVID 19 protocols.
- Project security adviser to issue advisories based on emerging health risks as well as COVID 19 infection numbers for Sokoto state.
- Medical insurance cover must be adequate for private health clinics and medical evacuation.
- Programme Crisis Management Plan to cover medical emergency.
- Signages and information should be displayed throughout the office environments both for visitors and staff on COVID 19 prevention and response numbers.
- Immediate vicinities of clinics, offices, stores, and vaccination centres must be cleared and fumigated in order to minimise presence of vectors.
- Staff should be trained in first response first aid including vector bites

**NEW RISK SCORE:** new probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
6 Medical Emergency	2	2	LOW

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### 5.2.7. FIRE EVENT.

#### RISK CONTROLS:

- Hotels, offices, stores and PHCs to be assessed by project security adviser for compliance with fire safety standards.
- Staff to be trained during security briefing on procedures and responses to fire emergencies.
- Electricity panels should be properly labelled and secured to prevent electrocution.
- Organisation's storage rooms cold chain equipment must be maintained, functional and adequate.
- Main and alternate muster points identified for evacuating building.
- Fire warden to ensure personnel list available to account for all personnel at office.
- Emergency response plan for fire at all locations to be briefed to new personnel by fire warden.
- Project vehicles to carry firefighting equipment.
- Workmanship done at offices, stores and buildings must be conducted by professionals with adequate records kept.
- Periodic service of firefighting equipment must be done and appropriately recorded.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
7 Fire Event	2	2	LOW

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## 5.2.8. ENVIRONMENTAL (WEATHER).

### RISK CONTROLS:

- Project security adviser ensures that selected staff hotels are not located in flood areas.
- 4x4 vehicles that can handle the terrain during severe weather should be provided to field teams where appropriate.
- Project staff must also understand and adhere to the World Bank Environment and Community Health and Safety standards (ESS4).
- Flood alerts to be issued to allow staff to adjust travel plans appropriately.
- Provision of appropriate volume of drinking water to staff when working in excessive temperature.
- Where rivers burst their banks due to excess rainfall, no attempt should be made to cross.
- Lightning resistors should be installed on buildings and particularly avoid vaccination exercises during lightening under trees

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
8 Environmental	2	2	LOW



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## 5.2.9. PROGRAMMATIC.

### RISK CONTROLS:

- Project staff should be briefed on World Bank health and safety standards contained in World Bank Environment and Social Framework handbook.
- Health and Safety briefings should be given daily to ensure stakeholders are aware of required protocols and procedures.
- Prompt payment of staff salary as well as adequate remuneration for those involved in vaccination process will ensure staff commitment to the programme.
- Project security adviser must monitor relationship between security agencies and the local community to know which agency is the most acceptable to provide security whilst also avoiding negative reactions.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
9 Programmatic	1	2	NEGLIGIBLE

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## 5.2.10. DEPLOYMENT.

### RISK CONTROLS:

- Adequate vehicles should be provided to vaccination teams
- Proper planning is required to ensure continuity of the cold chain during deployment (ice packs, cool boxes).
- Generators for alternative source of power must be regularly serviced to ensure vaccine efficacy
- The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be involved in the vaccination drive. The agency should be actively involved in dispelling fake news about the virus.
- The programme should have a close relationship with security personnel like the police to get security information before deployment. Areas where there may be conflict in the state should be avoided completely or only entered cautiously and with appropriate prior planning.
- A proper journey management process should be established.
- Staff should be briefed on security response to incidents while in the field.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
10 Deployment	2	1	NEGLIGIBLE

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### 5.2.11. POLITICAL.

#### RISK CONTROLS:

- Due to the coming 2023 elections, the vaccination programme should be conducted as soon as possible. This is important because the closer the programme gets to the coming election the bigger the possibility that an electioneering campaign gets prioritized over vaccination.
- To get adequate buy-in and increase vaccine acceptance, the influence of those traditional and religious leaders close to the people must be cultivated and employed.
- Project security adviser should identify areas that are contested by armed groups and ensure project staff avoid such locations. Where access is hindered by contesting armed groups, vaccination centres should be coordinated in safer locations

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
11 Political	2	2	LOW

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## 5.2.12. CORRUPTION.

### RISK CONTROLS:

- Internal control mechanisms, such as due diligence audit process, should be strengthened and transparent to ensure funds and processes are not tampered with.
- Vaccine distribution chain should be adequately monitored to nip any temptation for vaccine theft
- Staff must be trained to administer vaccines on basis of *'first-come first-serve'* rather than discriminating or prioritising stakeholder groups.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
12 Corruption	1	2	NEGLIGIBLE

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### 5.2.13. COMMUNICATION.

#### RISK CONTROLS:

- There should be adequate pre-delivery sensitization on vaccine administration using radio jingles and other media to reach remote communities, emphasising the benefits of the vaccination programme and explaining the delivery plan.
- Project security adviser should be involved in planning and site selection to avoid gatherings and excessive queues and rowdy sessions that have the likelihood of further increasing the spread of Covid.
- Alternate means of communication should be provided in places where telecom has been shutdown and other staff encouraged to have multiple SIM cards to stay connected.

**NEW RISK SCORE:** New probability and impact scores with the risk controls applied.

Risk name	Probability	Impact	Score
13 Communication	2	2	LOW

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## 6. PRACTICAL TOOLS FOR MANAGING RISKS.

### 6.1. Training

Staff and security agency induction training on SOPs and ERPs  
All programme and security agency personnel to be briefed on the delivery framework and RoE.  
Vaccination team training and rehearsals.

### 6.2. Drills

Background vetting.  
Covid-19 site protocol.


### 6.3. Equipment

Dedicated transport fleet.  
Vehicle trackers.  
Robust IT system and plan for data capture.  
Robust cold chain containers with appropriate time specifications for temperature retention.  
PPE provision (PHC sanitisation, masks, disinfectants, signage).  
Staff ID badges - a risk?  
Dual SIM phones.  
Sat phones.

### 6.4. Communication

WhatsApp Alert groups.  
'Constant companion' contact card.  
RoE card for security personnel.

## 7. SUMMARY OF SECURITY FINDINGS.



The above risk maps are a means of demonstrating the intended reduction in risk, using the proposed controls. The intention is to be able to use these controls to build the Security Management Framework, Emergency Response Plans and the appropriate staff and security training regimen and to accept the residual level of risk left in place. These controls do not guarantee such incidents won't happen, but they reduce the chances of one happening. If one occurs, the impact is minimised, and the chances of recovery are maximised.

The above controls can be grouped into the following broad categories, which will become the basic components of the deployment process and vaccination site mitigations by priority:

- Deployment and Recovery
- Physical barriers and structures, including lighting and other recommend works.
- Access Control – using checkpoints and registration points.
- Covid-19 protocols and PPE availability
- Cold Chain Management
- CoPREP/Security agency protocols and RoE

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Security procedures, training standards and contingency plans are key parts of the overall security management. An integrated security solution using people, technology and procedures involves all three aspects, and each must be carefully coordinated with the other two to produce a seamless security environment.

This risk assessment identifies the priority risks and provides a framework against which we identify the current security shortfalls and prioritise the recommended work to mitigate the gaps.